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Russia and the 'Legality' of Strasbourg Law
Mark Janis*
I.
On 28 February 1996, Russia acceded to the Statute of the Council of Europe, be-
coming the Council's thirty-ninth member. 1 Russia has been allotted eighteen seats
in Strasbourg's Parliamentary Assembly, giving it, alongside France, Germany, Italy
and the United Kingdom, one of the five largest national delegations. 2 Russia's
accession followed an extensive debate within the Council of Europe about the suit-
ability of the applicant for membership, and occurred despite an unfavourable Emi-
nent Lawyers Report prepared at the request of the Bureau of the Parliamentary
Assembly.3 The Report concluded 'that the legal order of the Russian Federation
does not, at the present moment, meet the Council of Europe standards as enshrined
in the statute of the Council and developed by the organs of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights'. 4 As a condition of joining the Council of Europe, Russia has
promised to ratify the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms 5 within one year of its accession to the Statute of the Coun-
cil.
6
The aim of this essay is to comment on Russia's accession to the Council of
Europe and its probable accession to the European Convention on Human Rights
from the perspective of the legal theory concerning the nature of obligation in inter-
* Reader in Law and Fellow of Exeter College, University of Oxford; sometime William F. Starr
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. The author thanks Risto Vahimets and Brenda
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1 'The 39 Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE) according to their date of membership (as
at 31 July 1996),' 17 Human Rights Law Journal (1996) 234.
2 Ibid.
3 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Bureau of the Assembly, Report on the Conformity of
the Legal Order of the Russian Federation with Council of Europe Standards Prepared by Rudolf
Bernhardt, Stefan Trechsel, Albert Weitzel, and Felix Ermnacora, 7 October 1994, AS/Bur/Russia
(1994) 7.
4 Ibid, at 85.
5 213 UNTS 221, ETS 5, UKTS 71 (1953), signed at Rome 4 November 1950, entered into force 3
September 1953, Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Centre edition (1995).
6 Reuter News Service, 'Yeltsin Approves Russia Entry to Council of Europe', Reuter Textline, 23
February 1996.
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national law and the law-like character of international law. The facts of Russia's
accession test a philosophical argument that has been made elsewhere about the
nature, efficacy and 'legality' of the legal system of the European Human Rights
Convention. 7 An important premise therein is that 'sometimes a happy (or unhappy)
confluence of political decisions, social attitudes, and individual actors and actions
makes possible the kind of breakthrough that converts ad hoc decision-making
bodies into legal tribunals and turns acquiescence into legal obligation' .8 The crux
of the argument is the assertion that the Strasbourg system of the European Human
Rights Convention, unlike so many other international legal systems, seems to have
passed its 'critical moment', moving from mere acquiescence to a sense of genuine
legal obligation. 9 This article asks what effect Russia's accession to the Convention
is likely to have on the sense of legal obligation within European human rights law.
It also questions whether Russia's accession, alongside the upsurge in nationalistic
assertions elsewhere in Europe, will imperil the legality 'breakthrough' of the Stras-
bourg system and its institutions.
It is important to recognize that these questions have broader implications than
for European human rights law alone. The 'breakthrough' (or not) of the Strasbourg
human rights system has critical repercussions on international law generally. The
institutional formality and apparent efficacy of European human rights law has gone
a long way towards rebutting the oft-repeated complaints about the non-law-like
character of international law. If the legal system of the European Human Rights
Convention is seen to fail, then faith in, and the success of, international law in gen-
eral will falter as well.
II.
H.L.A. Hart has portrayed the ordinary misgiving that many have in viewing any
form of international law as really 'law', stating that 'though it is consistent with the
usage of the last 150 years to use the expression "law" here, the absence of an inter-
national legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and centrally organized
sanctions have inspired misgivings, at any rate in the breasts of legal theorists'. 10
Hart responded to this misgiving by pointing out that whether or not any rule sys-
tem, including municipal law, is legally binding does not so much depend on
whether the system has organized sanctions, such as 'orders backed by threats', 1 I as
upon two other 'minimum conditions':
7 M.W. Janis, R.S. Kay and A.W. Bradley, European Human Rights Law (2nd ed., 1995). The
argument is most fully made in the section entitled 'The Convention and the Efficacy of Interna-
tional Law', 4-8.
8 Ibid, at 8.
9 Ibid.
10 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., 1994) 214.
11 Ibid, at 216-218.
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On the one hand, those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the sys-
tem's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand,
its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of
change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards
of official behaviour by its officials. 12
In other words, the success or even the existence of any 'real' legal system can
rightly be judged, first, by whether or not there is actual obedience to the system's
rules, and, second, by whether or not there develops what Hart has called an
'internal point of view'. This latter requires that there be:
... officials, lawyers, or private persons who use [the system's rules], in one
situation after another, as guides to the conduct of social life, as the basis for
claims, demands, admissions, criticism or punishment, viz., in all the familiar
transactions of life according to rules. For them the violation of a rule is not merely
a basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason for hostil-
ity.13
For his part, Hart concluded that, although 'no other social rules are so close to
municipal law as those of international law' and no matter how much the primary
rules of international law might in fact be followed in practice, the international
legal system needed more in the way of secondary systemic rules and formal legal
institutions if 'the sceptic's last doubts about the legal "quality" of international law'
were to 'be laid to rest'. 14
III.
There must, of course, be some doubt about the overall thrust of Hart's critique of
the law-like quality of international law. It seems, in practice, that international law
is better observed and more clearly perceived 'internally' as legitimate than ordinary
dismissals such as his allow. 15 Nonetheless, even accepting that much of interna-
tional law is neither so ordinarily well obeyed nor so usually recognized as legiti-
mate as much of municipal law, it has become increasingly difficult to accept such
objections with respect to the system of Strasbourg law. This is so for several rea-
sons.
First, there is case load. The number of admitted cases before the European
Commission of Human Rights has shot up from five in the 1950s, to fifty-four in
the 1960s, to 168 in the 1970s, 455 in the 1980s, and as high as 557 in the first
three years of the 1990s. 16 The judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
have exploded correspondingly: from none in the 1950s, to ten in the 1960s, twenty-
12 Ibid, at 116.
13 bid, at 90.
14 Ibid, at 236-237.
15 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave (2nd ed., 1979); T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among
Nations (1990).
16 Janis, Kay and Bradley, supra note 7, at 28-29.
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six in the 1970s, 169 in the 1980s, and up to 243 in just the first four years of the
1990s. 17
Second, there is efficacy. In 1950, it seemed that rendering both the right of
individual petition and the jurisdiction of the Court optional (in articles 25 and 46 of
the Convention) would limit the ability of the Strasbourg system to impinge upon
state sovereignty. 18 By the 1970s, however, most governments had accepted the two
optional clauses. By 1995, all thirty states then party to the Convention had con-
sented to both article 25 and article 46. Nowadays, all new parties are expected to
promptly accept both the right of individual petition and the jurisdiction of the
Court. 19 It appears in practice that states respect the adverse judgments of the
Court,20 even when the Court's judgment is seen, as in the McCann case, 21 to im-
peril vital national interests.22
Third, there is the growth in the number of parties to the European Human
Rights Convention. The Convention was ratified in 1953, with only eight member
states. By the end of the 1980s, there were 22 states members, encompassing virtu-
ally all of Western Europe. In 1990, Finland, freed from its 'neutral' status, joined
the Convention as the twenty-third member. From 1992 to 1996, the number of
members rapidly rose to thirty-three, with all newcomers, save Andorra, from the
former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.2 3 Russia and several
other states new to the Council of Europe seem soon to follow.
Fourth, there has been a crucial change of attitude both within and about
the Strasbourg institutions. The Strasbourg commissioners and judges have
become more confident over time. They are increasingly willing not only to rule
against governments, but to do so in more controversial cases. The turning point
probably occurred sometime in the late 1970s and early 1980s.24 This institu-
tional boldness has in turn encouraged lawyers and their clients, who have become
ever more ready to bring their complaints to the Commission and the Court, that
is, ever more willing to 'take a case to Strasbourg'. 25 So remarkable are these
changes in attitude that the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights
have become victims of their own success. The Strasbourg system, deluged with
cases, faces the prospect of a monumental and controversial reform in the guise of
Protocol No. 11, which, if ratified by all member states, will inter alia merge the
17 Ibid, at 70.
18 Ibid, at 18-25.
19 Ibid, at 27-29.
20 Ibid, at 83-87.
21 Judgment of 27 September 1995, 171199414641545.
22 'Outrage over Death on the Rock Verdict by Euro Court', The Times, 28 September 1995, p. 1;
'E40,000 Present for IRA Families - Britain Pays Terrorist Court Costs Early', Daily Mail, 27 De-
cember 1995, p. 1.
23 Supra note 1, at 234.
24 Janis, Kay and Bradley, supra note 7, at 70-87.
25 lbid, at 113.
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Commission into the Court and create a full-time Strasbourg judiciary of about forty
judges.26
IV.
The accession of Russia and of the other Central and Eastern European states to the
Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights may also be seen
as a price of success. The promotion of human rights in the Soviet bloc via the
'Helsinki Process' was long a foreign policy goal of both the United States and
Western Europe. At least as early as April 1991, a political decision had been made
that there was a political and moral requirement to open up the Council of Europe to
the new post-Communist governments in the East.27 In October 1993, the Summit
of the Council of Europe reiterated its commitment 'to pluralist and parliamentary
democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and a
common heritage enriched by diversity'. 2 8 Moreover, the Summit proclaimed that it
would welcome new Council members from 'the democracies of Europe freed from
communist oppression', so long as an applicant had 'brought its institutions and
legal system into line with the basic principles of democracy, the rule of law and
respect for human rights'. 29 To test whether an applicant's legal system meets these
standards, the Council of Europe has commissioned Eminent Lawyers Reports, such
as that which Russia failed.30 The decision in February 1996 to admit Russia to the
Council of Europe is commonly viewed as a result of giving greater weight to politi-
cal factors than to legal criteria, a realistic judgment given the importance of inte-
grating post-Communist Russia into the more democratic liberal realm of Western
Europe. 31
26 Council of Europe, Protocol No. I 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, H(94), 11 May
1994.
27 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 88th Session, 25 April 1991, 12 Human Rights Law
Journal (1991) 216.
28 Council of Europe, Vienna Declaration of 8/9 October 1993, 14 Human Rights LaIv Journal
(1993) 373.
29 Ibid, at 374.
30 Council of Europe, Report on the Conformity of the Legal Order of the Russian Federation with
Council of Europe Standards (1994). Other Eminent Lawyers Reports have been reprinted in the
Human Rights Law Journal, including those on Slovenia, 14 Human Rights Journal (1993) 437;
the Czech Republic, 14 Human Rights Law Journal (1993) 442; and Albania, 15 Human Rights
Law Journal (1995) 242.
31 Reuter News Service, 'Russia: Council Vote Pleases Yeltsin, Shocks Rights Monitors', 26 January
1996; Reuter News Service, 'Czech Republic: Havel Gives Qualified Welcome to Russia in Coun-
cil', 26 January 1996; Reuter News Service, 'Russia: Human Rights Commission Says "Political
Expediency" Prevailing Over Human Rights', 7 February 1996; Gazzini, 'Considerations on the
Conflict in Chechnya', 17 Human Rights Law Journal (1996) 93.
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V.
No matter how politically rational the decision to admit Russia to the Council of
Europe, it must be recognized that Russia's accession will result in two important
and probably negative consequences for the 'legality' of the Strasbourg human
rights law system. First, the participation of Russia increases the possibility that
European human rights law will both be disobeyed and be seen to be flouted. This
has, of course, occurred before, notably by the Colonels' regime in Greece between
1967 and 1974. That situation led to the condemnation of Greece by the European
Commission of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, as well as to the denunciation of the Convention by Greece in December
1969.32 Moreover, doubt has been expressed about the actual efficacy of the system,
even with regard to the traditional liberal democracies. 33
However, three aspects of Russia's accession are particularly troubling for the
future of compliance with Strasbourg law. First, at the present time, as the Eminent
Lawyers Report makes clear, Russia falls short of the usual European standard of the
rule of law and the protection of human rights. Second, given Russia's lack of expe-
rience in protecting human rights at the level of municipal law, it is likely that a
great many violations of European human rights law will be committed there, and
that they will not be remedied domestically. Third, the same political importance of
Russia that has prompted the Council of Europe to accept its admittance will make it
especially difficult for Strasbourg to force the Russian government to comply with
adverse findings.
The other significant consequence for the system of European human rights law
posed by Russia's accession is likely to be a new challenge to what, along with Hart,
we can call Strasbourg's 'internal point-of-view'. Given the difficulties of Russia
effectively complying with European human rights law in its municipal legal order
and of Strasbourg imposing its decisions upon the Russian government, there will be
a strong temptation for the Strasbourg institutions to fashion a two-tier legal order,
which would allow lower than normal expectations for Russia. This will have the
likely benefit of enabling Russia's continued participation in the system, but it will
threaten the perception of Hart's 'officials, lawyers or private persons' that Stras-
bourg law 'in one situation after another [is a guide] to the conduct of social life, as
the basis for claims, demands, admissions, criticism or punishment, viz., in all the
familiar transactions of life according to rules' .34
These probable challenges resulting from Russia's accession come at an awk-
ward moment for Strasbourg. Not only is the ambit of European human rights law
32 Janis, Kay and Bradley, supra note 7, at 51-64.
33 Churchill and Young, 'Compliance with Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and
Decisions of the Committee of Ministers: The Experience of the United Kingdom, 1975-1987', 62
British Yearbook of International Law (1992) 283.
34 Hart, supra note 10, at 90.
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being widened to reach out to the former Soviet bloc, but the potency of Strasbourg
law is being deepened by ever bolder Court judgments against national govern-
ments.35 This deepening, a welcome advance on international legal control, is pro-
ceeding just when the basic tenets of European unity are under increasing assault by
nationalistic sentiments across Europe. This is true not least in the United Kingdom
where both European human rights law and European economic law are perceived
more and more, not as solutions to European-wide problems, but as foreign threats
to national political and economic objectives. Hence, there is a danger that the fail-
ure of Russia to comply with European human rights law domestically and to obey
the decisions of the Strasbourg institutions and the creation of a two-tier human
rights system to accommodate Russia will give the governments of the existing
member states all the more latitude in weakening their own commitment to the
Strasbourg system. This all serves as a reminder that the 'breakthrough' of Stras-
bourg law to genuine legal obligation may not be forever.
35 Janis, Kay and Bradley, supra note 7, at 113-118.
